Court judgment (Single-Member Court of Appeals of Piraeus 365/2023) awarding compensation for a work accident, with 60% contributory fault of the employee and intent on the part of the employer.
SINGLE-MEMBER COURT OF APPEALS OF PIRAEUS
Composed of Judge Emmanouilia-Alexandra Kechagia, Appellate Judge, designated by the Director President of Appellate Judges of the Court of Appeals, and the Clerk, T.L.
Sat in public session in its courtroom in Piraeus on ……….. to try the case between:
The appellant, …………… who appeared through his attorney-in-fact, Anastasios Drovatzis.
The appellees: 1) The limited partnership having its registered office in …… (……….. Street), under the name «………..» and the distinctive title «……….» (VAT number (AFM) ………), duly represented, 2) ……….. 3) ……….. who appeared through their attorney-in-fact, Spyridon Papaioannou, by declaration pursuant to Article 242 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (KPolD).
The plaintiff filed before the Single-Member Court of First Instance of Piraeus his lawsuit dated 18-1-2019 (filing number ………../8-2-2019), which he requested be granted.
On this lawsuit, with both parties present, the Court issued its final judgment No. 415/2021, by which the lawsuit was dismissed as unfounded on the merits.
The plaintiff, by his appeal dated 20-1-2022 (filing number ………../21-1-2022), which was scheduled for hearing on the date noted at the beginning hereof and entered on the cause list, challenges the above first-instance judgment.
At that hearing the case was called in turn from the relevant cause list and was argued. During its hearing in the courtroom of this Court, the appellant’s attorney-in-fact requested that the matters set out in the minutes and the brief filed by him be accepted, while the appellees’ attorney-in-fact did not appear but was represented by his declaration pursuant to Article 242 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (KPolD), and pre-filed their brief.
HAVING STUDIED THE CASE FILE
HAVING DELIBERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW
. . .
The plaintiff set out in his lawsuit that, by oral agreement with the second defendant, general partner and legal representative of the first defendant, a limited partnership active in the manufacture of plastic products, he was hired on 15-2-2013, under a contract of dependent employment of indefinite duration, as a worker, specifically as an assembler of plastic products at the factory the latter maintains in ………….. That on 12-2-2014, while the supervising engineer, the third defendant, was absent, in the course of performing his work he sustained a serious injury to his right wrist with simultaneous severance of four fingers, as a result of which he underwent surgery and was hospitalised in a private hospital. That he was granted sick leave, after the expiry of which he was employed by the company in another position and was eventually dismissed on the grounds that its operations had contracted.
That as a result of the accident and his injury caused by the fault of the defendants, bordering on possible intent, he suffered loss, as analysed in detail, consisting of the cost of an improved diet, the notional cost of hiring a domestic helper and the difference between the earnings he would have received had the accident not occurred and those he ultimately received during the period from 9-12-2015 to 31-12-2018, as well as those he would have received until his retirement, that is to say the amount of 737 euros monthly, from 1-1-2019 until 2037, as well as moral damages, for the redress of which the reasonable amount of pecuniary compensation to which he is entitled amounts to 170,000 euros. That his permanent partial disability affects his future, as a result of which he is also entitled to special compensation under Article 931 of the Civil Code (AK), in the amount of 40,000 euros.
Subsequently, having converted his claim in part into a declaratory one, by declaration of his attorney-in-fact recorded in the minutes, he sought: 1) That the defendants be ordered to pay him jointly and severally the amount of 40,000 euros as pecuniary compensation for his moral damages, the amount of 10,000 euros as differences in earnings for the period from 9-12-2015 to 31-12-2018, and the amount of 6,650 euros as compensation for the loss he suffered, with statutory interest on all the above amounts from the service of the lawsuit until full payment, and the amount of 737 euros monthly from 1-1-2019 until his retirement in 2037, with statutory interest from the date each instalment falls due in arrears until full payment, and 2) That it be declared that they additionally owe him, jointly and severally, the amount of 130,000 euros as pecuniary compensation, 40,000 euros as special compensation under Article 931 of the Civil Code (AK) and the amount of 16,532 euros as differences in earnings, with statutory interest from the service of the lawsuit until full payment, and that the court costs be imposed on them.
On the lawsuit, the judgment under appeal was issued, by which it was dismissed as unfounded on the merits. The plaintiff complains against this judgment by the grounds set out in the appeal under review, which constitute objections amounting in their entirety to incorrect assessment of the evidence, and seeks, after its formal admission and acceptance on the merits, the setting aside of the judgment under appeal and the granting of the lawsuit in its entirety.
. . .
Thus, in the case of a work accident, where the injured employee is covered by IKA insurance, which has assumed the redress of his pecuniary loss, he has no standing to claim from the employer and the persons appointed by him also the autonomous compensation under Article 931 of the Civil Code (AK), on account of its pecuniary character. The employer and the persons appointed by him are released from the obligation to pay also the compensation under Article 931 of the Civil Code (AK), which has as its purpose the redress of the injured party’s pecuniary loss [Plenary Areios Pagos 18/2008, Athens Court of Appeals (Single-Member) 1258/2022, op. cit., Thessaloniki Court of Appeals (Single-Member) 2035/2021, published in the legal database «NOMOS», Thessaloniki Court of Appeals (Single-Member) 88/2020 op. cit.].
However, in every case, that is to say even where the employer is released from the obligation to pay compensation, the victim of a work accident retains the claim for pecuniary compensation on account of moral damages against the employer, for which there is no provision in Law 551/1915, provided that the accident is due to fault (intent or negligence of any form) of the employer or of the persons appointed by him, judged according to the common law (Articles 914, 922, 932 of the Civil Code (AK)), without the special fault of failing to comply with prescribed safety measures being required [Areios Pagos 246/2022 op. cit., AP 231/2021, AP 160/2021 published in the legal database «NOMOS», Piraeus Court of Appeals (Single-Member) 91/2022, Piraeus Court of Appeals (Single-Member) 266/2022 op. cit.].
. . .
The product then passes through the cutting station, where, by means of a cutting mould equipped with blades that move up and down, the trays or other items are severed and forwarded to the final packaging station. Between the stations there is a gap of approximately one metre. The forming and cutting stations are covered by doors for the protection of the operators, which are closed in automatic operation and open in manual operation.
The production process for plastic products is carried out in automatic operation, in which the production flow is faster than in manual operation, and with the doors closed, which are equipped with electromagnetic sensors, with the result that, when they open, the operation of the machine is interrupted, and when they close, it resumes automatically. Manual operation is selected by the operator using a special switch near his position, during the procedure of setting up the machine (test operation), that is, when the existing mould is changed and another is fitted for the manufacture of a different item. During this procedure, the doors of the stations are open so that the appropriate mould may be fitted.
Initially, the forming station begins operation, and five movements take place, before the cutting station has yet begun to move (up and down), since by then no already formed item has reached its level. At this phase of operation, that is, until the cutting station begins to move, the operator can place his hands inside it.
After this point, in the event that some item becomes stuck inside the machine at any position, if it occurs between the stations, he has the ability to remove it safely; otherwise he must, after switching the machine’s operation to manual and opening the doors of the station, then interrupt its operation, by means of a switch located approximately one to one and a half metres from the operator’s position. The plaintiff alleges that the doors of the stations were always left open in automatic operation for reasons of speed, by covering their sensors, and that, according to the instructions given to him, in the event that the production flow stopped because of an item being made becoming stuck, the safety officer would interrupt the power supply and then, when the problem had been resolved, restore it through the electrical power supply switch, that is, the switch supplying power, among other things, to the specific machine, and not the switch of the machine itself.
Indeed, he implies that no prior coordination took place between the safety officer and the operator, which means that the safety officer would have had to be in the area where the machine was located, which was a distinct area with a surface of approximately 15-20 square metres. He also alleged that, owing to the inconsistency observed in this coordination, the machine operators at the factory had complained on many occasions. This version, however, is not corroborated by any other items of evidence, except for the witness for the plaintiff, who knows what the plaintiff himself told him, and is contrary to logic.
Specifically, it was not in the first place proved that the safety officer or any substitute of his was, or could have been, on standby every time some item became stuck in this or any other machine in the factory premises, since it was practically impossible for him to be present at all the machines of the factory and to have visual contact with them at every moment so as to intervene. Nor did the plaintiff allege that he would notify him on every occasion so that he could come to the spot and have visual contact with the specific machine, should such a problem arise.
In any event, it was not proved that the interruption of the power supply concerned only the specific machine, and thus it would not have been possible, every time a technical problem appeared in some machine, for the operation of more, or even all, of the machines in the business to be interrupted. Moreover, even on this version, the plaintiff knew that on that day the safety officer or any substitute of his was not in the area where he was working, and therefore that the specific procedure could not be followed. Furthermore, the reasons of speed which the plaintiff himself invoked as being served by leaving the doors open are neither explained nor proved.
Besides, the procedure of switching the machine’s operation from automatic to manual and then interrupting its operation was simple and brief, and did not significantly burden the production process in terms of time. Finally, on the plaintiff’s version, since the power supply could not be interrupted, it would not be reasonable, and would offer no benefit, for the doors of the cutting machine to remain open, because: (a) it is certain, and the plaintiff himself knew, that with the removal of the item obstructing the operation of the machine, that operation would resume automatically; (b) the speed of movement of the cutting machine did not allow the operator to place his hands inside it, that is, the plaintiff knew that, in moving the item that had become stuck, he would not have time to withdraw his hand safely.
Besides, since, according to his own allegations, the sticking of an item was a frequent occurrence, if matters had stood as he says, it is assessed with certainty that other accidents would also have occurred in the past and up to the present day. Furthermore, whether the accident occurred at 16.00, as stated in the lawsuit, or at 18.00, according to the work accident notification submitted by the first defendant, the affidavit of the second defendant, the certification of the witness ……… and the handwritten description note co-signed by the third defendant, the aforementioned employee ………, who was working together with the plaintiff on the specific day and at the time of the accident at the forming station but was not exactly there at the time of the accident, and the second defendant, it was not proved that the machine was in test operation, since this lasts at most 30 minutes, which had in any event already elapsed since the start of his shift at around 15.00.
On the basis, therefore, of the foregoing, and without the type of object that became stuck and obstructed the production flow, interrupting the operation of the machine — the plaintiff himself in his lawsuit refers to a blade, while in his unsworn deposition to a tray — exerting any material influence, the only logical version of the accident is that the production process was indeed interrupted by some object that became stuck inside the cutting station.
This had as its result that the operation of the machine was momentarily interrupted, whereupon the plaintiff opened the doors of the station and switched its operation from automatic to manual, in order to be able to remove the object, by pressing the switch provided for that purpose near him, but without deactivating the machine, that is, without interrupting its power supply. With the selection of manual operation, its speed was reduced, and he evidently believed that he would have time to remove the object as well as his hand safely, which did not happen. This manner of acting was with certainty contrary to the instructions given to him primarily by the safety officer and his supervisor, the third defendant, but also by the second defendant, which he himself, by virtue of his experience and educational level, was able to assess as being of substance.
The most logical version is that, precisely because of his experience, he believed he could do it safely, as he had probably done on another occasion in the past, without the knowledge of the foregoing persons. It should be noted that on 26-2-2014 the accident was reported to the Social Insurance Foundation, with which the plaintiff is insured, and an on-site inspection was carried out in his presence (relevant: the inspection report dated 7-3-2014). The summary accident investigation report dated 15-3-2014 was drawn up in this connection, in which, on the basis of the aforementioned handwritten note, the witness certification dated 26-2-2014 and his affidavit dated 7-3-2014, the time of the accident was recorded as 18.00 and the cause of its occurrence as the placing of his hand into the cutting mould in order to remove a poorly formed tray, with the result that the conclusion was drawn that the accident was due exclusively to his own negligence.
The plaintiff, however, while in this affidavit he attributes the accident to his own carelessness, with the violation, through his own fault, of the protection and safety systems with which the machine was equipped, has now departed from this position, alleging that the content of this printed, rather than handwritten, declaration does not reflect his true intention, and that the reason for its drafting and for not filing a criminal complaint against those responsible was the first defendant’s promises of his rehabilitation, which were belied, since their working relationship was ultimately terminated through the fault of its legal representative.
In view of the above findings, the plaintiff’s injury constitutes a work accident, that is to say a violent occurrence which took place during the performance of the above work entrusted to him by the first defendant. To its causation contributed predominant negligence on his own part to the extent of 60% and concurrent negligence of the second and also the third defendant, that is to say of the legal representative and of the supervisor of the machine operators at the first defendant, the latter as a person appointed by it, since he was continuously providing it, as its employee, with services for the handling of its affairs, acting under the control of its legal representative and serving its interests (AP 218/2018, AP 585/2017, AP 910/2015 published in the legal database «NOMOS»), to the extent of 40%.
More specifically, the above defendants, in their said capacities, did not act in accordance with the diligence required, measured against the average prudent and diligent representative of their sphere of activity, but contrary to the requirements of the legal order, by violating the general duty of care and safety owed to the plaintiff that was socially imposed upon them by virtue of their capacity and in good faith, in view of the dangers entailed by the operation of the specific machine, which made the taking of measures to prevent damage to his protected legal interests imperative (AP 1133/2017, 1398/2015, published in the legal database «NOMOS»).
Specifically, they did not see to it, as every reasonably prudent person would have done and as they themselves were able to do by virtue of their capacities, that the rules for the safe operation of the specific machine which the plaintiff was operating were strictly observed; rules which prescribed a specific manner of action in the event that some item being manufactured either became stuck or was deformed at the cutting station, and its removal was required, making it clear that, otherwise, there would be consequences for him on the part of his employer, so as to deter the employee from undertaking initiatives that might expose him to danger. It does not suffice, that is, that they themselves or possibly the safety technician gave relevant instructions; they should have ensured that those instructions were unfailingly observed by the operators, particularly given that the safety technician with subject-matter responsibility visited the factory only once a month.
Thus, had the plaintiff known that, if he deviated from the specific manner of dealing with problems, he risked even losing his job, he would not have acted at his own discretion, in the hope that he would not run any risk. Their said omission stands in adequate causal connection with the accident, since it was, according to the teachings of common experience, that is to say in the usual and normal course of events, capable of producing the specific result, namely the complacency of the plaintiff and his exposure to danger by undertaking initiative as to the manner of removing an object from the cutting station.
Thus, the first defendant is liable for this culpable omission: as regards the second defendant, as the organ that represents it, since his act took place in the performance of his duties, the latter being liable jointly and severally with it (Article 71 of the Civil Code (AK)); and as regards the third defendant, on a strict-liability basis, as the person who appointed him (Article 922 of the Civil Code (AK)), since likewise there was a causal connection between the service entrusted to him and the accident, and therefore all the defendants are liable to the plaintiff jointly and severally pursuant to Article 926 of the Civil Code (AK). The plaintiff’s own liability consists in that he, although by virtue of his experience he knew of the dangers arising from non-compliance with the safety conditions that had been pointed out to him, acted in violation of those conditions, attempting to remove a tray from the cutting station without having interrupted the operation of the machine, with the result that he failed to foresee his injury, or hoped to avoid it through the timely withdrawal of his hands.
Consequently, the first-instance Court, by an erroneous assessment of the evidence, held that the accident in question was due to the exclusive fault of the plaintiff, and the —sole— ground of appeal of erroneous assessment of the evidence must be allowed in respect of this specific issue, as well-founded both as a matter of law and on the merits, as must the plea of contributory fault of the plaintiff in the causation of the accident and his injury, which the appellees raised in the alternative, in the proportion mentioned above.
Beyond this, since neither the violation of specific statutory provisions on employee safety conditions was proved, nor any intent on the part of the defendant natural persons, the plaintiff, who suffered an accident in the course of his work and is covered by the insurance of the Social Insurance Foundation, cannot, on the basis of the relevant reasoning set out above, claim from the second and third defendants, and consequently from the first, compensation for his pecuniary loss, including the autonomous compensation under Article 931 of the Civil Code (AK), in line with the well-founded plea of the appellees that there was, in any event, no special negligence on their part within the meaning of Article 16 para. 1 of Law 551/1915, and the relevant heads of claim must be dismissed as unfounded on the merits. Therefore, the first-instance Court, in reaching the same conclusion, ruled correctly as to outcome, albeit with different reasoning, which is replaced by the reasoning of the present judgment, and the ground of appeal alleging defective assessment of the evidence must be dismissed as unfounded on the merits in respect of those heads of claim.
It was also proved that the plaintiff, immediately after his injury, was transferred initially to the General Hospital of Attica «KAT», having sustained an amputating wound of the right upper limb at the level of the wrist, and on the same day, owing to the lack of capacity to perform microsurgery there, to the private hospital «YGEIA», where an incomplete but non-viable amputation of the right forearm and a complete amputation of digits II-V of the same hand, a fracture of the right ulna and the right radius were diagnosed. He was immediately subjected to internal osteosynthesis of the fractures of the bones of the forearm and then to revascularisation of the limb and restoration of the median nerve and of the severed muscles and tendons, and partial closure of the wound of the right forearm and of the stumps of the amputated fingers was carried out. On 19-2-2014 he underwent surgical restoration of the post-traumatic skin defect on the anterior surface of the right forearm, with the placement of a full-thickness skin graft, and remained hospitalised until 23-2-2014, when he was discharged with instructions for follow-up, a recommendation for analgesic treatment and leave from his work for 3 months.
By successive decisions of the Director of the Nikaia branch of IKA, until 31-12-2014 he received sickness benefit from his social security institution. Finally, by Decision No. …../6-6-2016 of the Director of the Piraeus branch of IKA-ETAM, he was awarded a disability pension until 31-12-2018, after a 50% disability rating had previously been recognised in his favour on account of his amputation, which has now been extended by the more recent Decision No. …../14-1-2019 thereof, from 1-1-2019, indefinitely. Following the accident he developed an anxiety-depressive disorder, with restlessness and irritability, mood disturbances with reduced interest in things, sleep disturbances with awakenings and episodes of outbursts of anger, taking, for that reason, on the recommendation of a doctor, pharmaceutical treatment.
Therefore, and irrespective of the fact that he cannot claim compensation for his pecuniary loss under the provisions of the common law, the plaintiff, aged 42 at the time of the accident, suffered moral damages on account of his injury, which resulted in the amputation of four fingers of his right hand, his hospitalisation, his undergoing two surgical operations, his physical and psychological suffering owing to the considerable period of time required for his recovery, as well as his now permanent disability, his consequent inability to work and his early retirement, the restriction of his physical activities and the psychological burden upon him from all these reasons.
For the redress thereof, the reasonable pecuniary compensation that should be awarded to him, in accordance with the principle of proportionality (Plenary AP 9/2015 ChrID 2015.575, AP 88/2018 published in the legal database «NOMOS»), amounts, taking into account the degree of negligence of the second and third defendants as well as the concurrent negligence of the plaintiff himself in the causation of the accident, the more particular circumstances, the extent, type and seriousness of his injury, as well as the financial and social position of the litigant natural persons and of the first defendant as a limited partnership, in respect of whose financial position evidence is produced only for the tax year 2018, in which it showed a loss of 54,433 euros, to the amount of 12,000 euros, which exceeds that sought by way of enforcement claim.
Consequently, the first-instance Court, which dismissed the relevant head of claim in its entirety, defectively assessed the evidence, and the ground of appeal alleging defective assessment of the evidence must be allowed in respect of the specific head of claim, as well-founded both as a matter of law and on the merits in respect of that amount.
In consequence of the foregoing, the appeal under review must be allowed, by acceptance of its sole ground alleging erroneous assessment of the evidence; the judgment under appeal must accordingly be set aside, pursuant to Article 535 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (KPolD), as must necessarily also its provision concerning court costs, which shall be redetermined ab initio (Eastern Crete Court of Appeals 79/2014 published in the legal database «NOMOS», Athens Court of Appeals 1404/2014 Arm 2015.288).
Subsequently, the case being retained by this Court and the lawsuit dated 18-1-2019 (filing number ……../8-2-2019) examined, this lawsuit must be allowed in part, both as a matter of law and on the merits, and the defendants must be ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff, on the ground set out in the reasoning, the amount of 12,000 euros, with statutory interest from its service until full payment.
Furthermore, the court costs of the parties for both instances must be apportioned between them, on their relevant request, in proportion to the extent of their victory and defeat, as more specifically determined in the operative part (Articles 106, 176, 178 § 2, 183 and 191 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (KPolD), 63 §§ 1iα, 68 § 1, 69 para. 1 sub-para. (a), in conjunction with Annex IB to Article 166 of Law 4194/2013).
FOR THESE REASONS
TRIES the appeal of the plaintiff dated 20-1-2022 (filing number ……../21-1-2022) against Final Judgment No. 415/2021 of the Single-Member Court of First Instance of Piraeus, both parties being present.
ACCEPTS the appeal formally and on the merits.
SETS ASIDE the judgment under appeal.
RETAINS the case and tries on the merits the lawsuit dated 18-1-2019 (filing number ………./8-2-2019).
ALLOWS the lawsuit in part.
ORDERS the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the amount of twelve thousand (12,000) euros, with statutory interest from the day following service of the lawsuit until full payment.
IMPOSES upon the appellees-defendants part of the court costs of the plaintiff-appellant for both instances, which it sets at the amount of one thousand two hundred (1,200) euros.
Adjudicated, decided and delivered in extraordinary public session in its courtroom, without the parties or their attorneys-in-fact being present, on 29-6-2023.
THE JUDGE THE CLERK
- See also article Termination of Employment Contract
- See also article Severance Pay
- See also article Variation of Employment Terms
- See also article Suspension of Work
- See also article Annual Statutory Leave
- See also article Employee Remuneration
- See also article Overtime and Excess Work
- See also article Employer Obligations
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON WORK ACCIDENT COMPENSATION JUDGMENTS WITH CONTRIBUTORY FAULT OF THE EMPLOYEE
1. As an employer, what claims do I face from an employee injured at my factory?
The injured employee may, as a rule, bring a claim against you for pecuniary compensation on account of moral damages (Article 932 of the Civil Code (AK)), provided he proves fault on your part or on the part of the persons appointed by you (managers, supervisors). If the employee is insured with EFKA (formerly IKA), the pecuniary loss and the claim under Article 931 of the Civil Code (AK) are covered by the social security institution and are not directed against the employer. The claim for moral damages, however, remains open, often amounting to several tens of thousands of euros, and is accompanied by criminal prosecution for negligent bodily harm (Article 314 of the Penal Code (PK)) against the legal representative and the supervisors.
2. When is contributory fault of the employee recognised, and what practical benefit does it have?
Contributory fault of the employee is recognised when the employee himself violated express safety instructions, acted on his own initiative or used the machine in a manner he knew to be dangerous. In Judgment No. 365/2023 of the Single-Member Court of Appeals of Piraeus, contributory fault of the employee was recognised at 60%, because he attempted to remove an object from a cutting station without interrupting the power supply. The practical benefit for the employer is the proportional reduction of the pecuniary compensation awarded by the same percentage, as well as a strong argument for limiting criminal liability to the lighter form of negligence.
3. Does professional liability insurance cover the compensation I will be required to pay?
It depends on the specific insurance policy. Employer civil liability policies usually cover pecuniary compensation for moral damages and supplementary pecuniary loss beyond EFKA benefits, with a maximum limit per event. Significant exclusions are the employer’s intent, the violation of health and safety rules under Law 3850/2010, the failure to engage a safety technician and undeclared work. In such cases the insurance company, as a rule, refuses cover and the employer is personally liable. It is advisable to review the insurance policy immediately after the incident and to give timely notice to the insurance company.
4. What criminal exposure do I face if the Labour Inspectorate finds safety omissions?
Beyond the civil claim, the employer and the legal representative of the company face criminal prosecution for negligent bodily harm (Article 314 of the Penal Code (PK)), punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, or for negligent homicide (Article 302 of the Penal Code (PK)) in the event of death. In parallel, administrative fines are imposed by the Labour Inspectorate for violations of Law 3850/2010, which can reach several tens of thousands of euros per violation. In serious cases, temporary suspension of operations is ordered. Contributory fault of the employee is used as a mitigating factor but does not eliminate the employer’s liability.
5. How long elapses between the filing of the lawsuit and the final irrevocable judgment?
In the above case the lawsuit was filed in February 2019, the first-instance judgment was issued in 2021 and the appellate judgment in 2023, that is, approximately four years were required to reach res judicata. As a rule, employment disputes of this category before the Single-Member Court of First Instance are tried within 12-18 months from filing, and the appeal requires a further 18-24 months. If a cassation appeal is lodged, the time is further extended. During this period, criminal prosecution may be pending in parallel, the decisions of which are taken into account by the civil court but are not absolutely binding upon it.
6. What is the role of the lawyer in defending an employer following a work accident?
The Law Firm ZIAMPARAS D. & ASSOCIATES undertakes the holistic defence of the employer simultaneously on three levels of liability: civil, criminal and administrative. Specifically, evidence is immediately gathered (safety records, staff training documents, safety technician archives, statements of co-workers), the employee’s conduct is analysed in order to substantiate his contributory fault, and the coverage of the professional liability insurance policy is assessed. In parallel, the client is represented before the Labour Inspectorate, the Public Prosecutor and the civil courts, with a view to limiting the pecuniary compensation awarded and averting criminal conviction.